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ABSTRACT 
According to situated cognition theory, cognitive accomplishments rely in part on structures and 
processes outside the individual.  This article argues that interactional structures—particularly 
those created through language use—can make essential contributions to situated cognition in 
rational academic discourse.  Most cognitive accomplishments rely in part on language, and 
language in use always has both representational and interactional functions.  The article 
analyzes one classroom conversation, in order to illustrate how the interactional functions of 
speech can facilitate the cognitive accomplishments speakers make through that speech.  By 
showing how closely cognition and interaction can interrelate, the article both supports theories 
of situated cognition and shows how cognition in at least some educational contexts cannot be 
extricated from enduring social structures and the construction of social identity. 
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 Situated cognition depends on various interlocking structures and processes, many of 
which lie beyond the individual mind.  These structures and processes are found in others' 
knowledge as well as in physical and symbolic tools (Goodwin, 1995; Greeno, 1997; Hutchins, 
1995; Wertsch, 1998).  Advocates of situated cognition also cite social interaction as another 
potential source of structures that might contribute to cognition.  Greeno, for instance, calls for 
"increasingly detailed analyses of structures of information that are produced by the interactions 
people have with each other and with the material and representational structures in their 
environments" (1997:15; italics added).  A few have begun to study how contingent interactional 
structures can facilitate cognition (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Goodwin, 
1984, 1995; Silverstein, 1985, 1998).  Most of this work has focused on task-oriented or casual 
talk.  In this article, I explore how interactional structures and processes can facilitate cognition 
in rational academic discourse. 
I focus on interactional processes that go on through language use in particular.  Speech 
always both communicates information and contributes to interaction.  All utterances function 
both to denote something about possible or actual worlds and to position speakers and audience 
members in some social space.  Cognitive analyses of language most often focus on the 
denotational function of language—on how the reference and predication accomplished through 
speech can contribute to cognitive accomplishments.  This article argues that, in some cases, the 
interactional positioning accomplished through speech can also contribute to cognitive 
accomplishments.  To make this argument I describe a complex type of case, in which the 
denotational and interactional structures created through speech mirror or double each other.  
That is, in this sort of case speakers do what they say, through the same words that they use to 
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say it (Wortham, 1994, 1997).  The article shows how in such cases denotational and 
interactional structures can work together to facilitate cognition. 
The first section below describes theories of situated cognition and the role extra-mental 
structures and processes can play in cognitive accomplishments.  The second section focuses on 
deictics, a type of linguistic form in which the denotational and interactional functions of speech 
inevitably and systematically interrelate.  Analysis of deictics establishes that the denotational 
and interactional functions of speech depend on each other, and this suggests that cognition 
might depend on the interactional functions of speech as well.  The third section analyzes a 
particular verbal interaction in which both denotational and interactional structures contribute to 
the cognition involved—a classroom discussion in which teachers and students face the 
cognitive challenge of understanding an alien cultural practice.  This section describes in detail 
the complex interactional positioning speakers accomplish in the classroom discussion.  The 
fourth section argues that the interactional structures enacted in the classroom make essential 
contributions to the cognitive accomplishments made there.  The final section summarizes the 
central point: even rational, academic cognitive accomplishments can be deeply interconnected 
with the complexities of social life. 
 
Situated Cognition 
 People succeed at cognitive tasks by virtue of mediating structures or processes.  As 
analysts we explain people's successful actions by modeling the structures or processes relevant 
to completion of the particular task.  Traditional cognitive science often analyzed the structure of 
the final performance—say, the skillful telling of a narrative—and concluded that a mental 
analogue of this entire structure must be the mechanism generating the performance.  Many have 
questioned this approach (e.g., Greeno, 1997; Silverstein, 1993b; van Gelder, 1995), on two 
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grounds.  First, the mechanism producing the performance need not be as elaborate as an 
analyst's post hoc analysis of that performance—just as thermostats do not represent much about 
the nature of temperatures and human comfort zones.  Second, the structures and processes that 
facilitate the performance might not all be located in the individual mind. 
 Many have recently argued that these two insights should lead us to a fundamentally 
different approach to studying cognition (Greeno, 1997; Hutchins, 1995; Looren de Jong, 1997; 
Salomon & Perkins, 1998).  Looren de Jong distinguishes between a "Cartesian" psychology that 
posits an individual mind separate from and representing the world and a "naturalistic" 
psychology that sees the mind as embedded in the environment.  Greeno distinguishes between a 
"cognitive perspective" that explains cognitive accomplishments with respect to structures and 
processes in the individual mind and a "situative perspective" that explains such 
accomplishments with reference to cognitive systems that stretch across physical, social and 
symbolic environments.  All these advocates of a naturalistic or situative alternative admit that 
more work must be done in order to flesh out the alternative, and to assess its true promise, 
before we can conclude that a new approach is warranted. 
 Advocates of a situative approach do not deny the existence of individual minds, mental 
structures and processes.  If a cognition is situated, it is true that cognitive accomplishments are 
"not attributable to any individual" alone (Hutchins, 1993:35) and that "Knowledge" (with a 
capital K) should instead be attributed to the relations among various components of a person-
society-environment cognitive system (Lave, 1993).  But, as Wertsch (1998), Kirschner and 
Whitson (1997) and others argue, situative perspectives should not succumb to social 
determinism either.  Cognitive accomplishments cannot be attributed solely to physical or social 
structures and processes.  Many cognitive accomplishments do depend in part on individual 
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mental representations (Salomon & Perkins, 1998) and sometimes on decontextualized 
algorithms (Greeno, 1997).  In order to explain human cognitive accomplishments in general, 
however, we must cite more than individual mental structures and processes. 
 The central premise of situative accounts is that cognitive accomplishments result from 
"intact activity systems" that can include mental, social, physical and symbolic structures that all 
interrelate so as to allow successful action (Goodwin, 1995; Greeno, 1997; Hutchins, 1995; 
Latour, 1993).  Borrowing a term from Lemke (1997), I will call these "ecosocial systems."  This 
is not a new concept, of course.  Bateson (1972) describes how cognitive accomplishments rely 
on a circuit of activity involving structures from the mind, the body, tools and the environment.  
Vygotsky (1997) describes how systems of mental processes, integrated with physical and 
symbolic tools, can lead to the development of higher mental functions.  And Gibson (1979) 
describes how cognitive-perceptual accomplishments rely on structures in the world as well as 
structures in the mind.  But recent descriptions of ecosocial systems are becoming more detailed 
and systematic, and they have begun to attract wider attention among cognitive scientists. 
 Recent advances include the rich descriptions of particular ecosocial systems provided by 
Goodwin (1995) and Hutchins (1995).  Theorists have also made some progress in describing the 
components of ecosocial systems.  Lave (1993) and Wertsch (1998) propose a three-level 
account, in terms of (1) the person or "intramental" structures and processes, (2) the activity or 
"intermental" structures and processes that involve both tools and other participants in the 
cognitive task, and (3) the situation or socio-historical structures and processes.  Engeström 
(1993) and Engeström and Cole (1997) offer a slightly different taxonomy of ecosocial systems' 
components, citing the subject, the object, the tools and the larger community.  Others, like 
Hutchins (1995), Latour (1993) and Wortham (1998), argue that many heterogeneous types of 
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structures and processes can participate in the ecosocial systems that facilitate cognitive 
accomplishments.  Other types of relevant structures and processes might include the semiotic 
organization described by Walkerdine (1997), the ontogenetic and phylogenetic patterns 
described by Cole (1996) and the organization of physical space described by Hutchins (1995). 
 All advocates of situated cognition agree that cognitive accomplishments depend on 
systems that connect various structures and processes, including but not necessarily limited to 
aspects of the individual person, the tool-mediated activity and the socio-historical situation.  
Significant dispute continues, however, on at least three questions.  The analysis of interactional 
positioning and situated cognition given in this article contributes to answering each of these 
three questions. 
(1) Exactly what types of structures and processes can contribute to ecosocial systems 
and thus facilitate cognition?  To answer this question will require convincing empirical 
demonstrations of how novel structures and processes contribute.  This article contributes to the 
list of potentially relevant structures, by describing how a particular type of emergent 
interactional structure can sometimes contribute to cognitive accomplishments. 
(2) Do academic cognitive tasks, as opposed to non-academic tasks, depend more heavily 
on individual mental structures and processes?  Some describe cognition as a dialectic 
relationship between individual thought on the one hand and ecosocial processes on the other 
(e.g., Cobb, Gravemeijer, Yackel, McClain & Whitenack, 1997; Salomon & Perkins, 1998).  
Others criticize this view, arguing that the person represents merely one among many potentially 
central components of ecosocial systems (e.g., Engeström & Cole, 1997; Hutchins, 1995; 
Walkerdine, 1997).  Clark and Toribio (1994) suggest that we might avoid this dispute by 
conceiving a continuum of cognitive tasks: some tasks, like the academic ones studied by Cobb 
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et al. (1997), are more “representation-hungry” and thus will require more substantial 
contributions from individual mental representations, while for other tasks intramental structures 
will play a smaller role.  By showing the importance of interactional structures in an apparently 
"'representation-hungry" academic task, the case described in this article shows that the ecosocial 
systems used to complete at least some academic tasks can centrally depend on supra-individual 
structures. 
(3) How central a role does socio-historical context play in facilitating cognitive 
accomplishments?  Engeström (1993; Engeström & Cole, 1997), Lemke (1997) and Walkerdine 
(1997) argue that structures and processes from the collective social world play a more central 
role than most situated cognition theorists acknowledge.  Lave (1993) claims that situated 
cognition theory can describe how both immediate situations and socio-historical contexts 
contribute to ecosocial systems.  The case described in this article supports her claim, by 
describing how cognitively-functional interactional structure can emerge in particular situations, 
yet draw on institutional patterns of power and identity. 
 
Deictics and Interactional Structure 
Language plays an important role in most ecosocial systems, and spoken language plays 
a role in many.  In fact, speech can contribute to cognitive accomplishments in several ways.  
First, the information represented by speech often contributes to the solution of cognitive 
problems.  We can see this in Hutchins' (1993, 1995) classic example of navigating a military 
ship.  The information required to navigate the ship circulates in a system composed of various 
crew members' minds and physical orientations, physical arrangements of the ship and the task 
environment, specialized navigational devices that provide bearings and symbolic tools like 
maps.  The system also depends on the speech that crew members use to communicate.  Speech 
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does not represent the majority of the information required to navigate the ship, but it 
nonetheless plays an essential role in the system.  At the same time as this or any speech 
represents information, however, it inevitably has interactional functions as well (Halliday, 1978; 
Jakobson, 1960).  All speech positions speakers and audience members interactionally at the 
same time as it represents information about some actual or possible world.  This raises a 
question.  If the representational function of speech often plays a necessary role in ecosocial 
systems, and if speech inevitably establishes interactional as well as representational patterns, 
what influence do the interactional patterns have on cognition? 
One possible answer is "none."  While speech contributes to cognition through the 
information it represents, the interactional events might constitute a separate and cognitively-
irrelevant layer of human activity.  If one of the crew members described by Hutchins (1993, 
1995) were to insult others by presupposing higher status for him or herself while verbally 
informing other crew members of the ship's position, for instance, the fact of the insult might not 
change the cognitively-relevant information communicated.  The insult might disrupt the 
cognitive activity, if crew members get distracted and fail to make their contributions to the 
ecosocial system that yields knowledge of the ship's position.  But even in such a case the 
interactional pattern would remain extrinsic to the system.  While I would agree that some 
interactional patterns are extrinsic to ecosocial systems in this way, this section argues that in 
many cases interactional patterns make central and systematic contributions to representation 
and thus to cognition.  Speech can contribute to cognitive accomplishments in at least two 
ways—by representing information and by establishing cognitively-relevant interactional 
patterns. 
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In order to understand how interactional patterns created through speech can contribute 
to cognition, we need a more precise vocabulary for describing language use.  Silverstein 
(1993a) provides several useful concepts.  A "discursive interaction" is a social event of using 
language.  Interactional participants and outside analysts try to understand the meaning of a 
discursive interaction by modeling its coherence.  That is, participants and analysts try to 
understand the various segments of the discursive interaction as recognizable components of 
some established type of speech event—understanding, for instance, that a series of utterances 
was a narrative of personal experience because they can model them as describing a setting, 
complicating action, resolution and coda.  Participants and analysts use two basic types of 
models in understanding the meaningful coherence of discursive interaction: "denotational text" 
and "interactional text."  When participants and analysts understand a discursive interaction as a 
denotational text, they model the linguistic expressions that compose that interaction as having 
particular referential and predicational values that contribute to some coherent message.  For 
instance, the next section analyzes a classroom discussion as a type of denotational text—an 
argument, with several components, through which the teachers showed how an alien practice 
(Spartan infanticide) was similar in some respects to some contemporary Western practices.  
Denotational texts are ultimately interactional accomplishments, insofar as participants must co-
construct and/or ratify each other's presuppositions about what is in fact being denoted 
(Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Goodwin, 1979).  But this co-construction yields a model of what has 
been denoted or represented, not what has been enacted.  When participants and analysts 
understand a discursive interaction as an interactional text, they model the linguistic expressions 
that compose that interaction as having indexical values that collectively presuppose a 
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recognizable type of interaction (an insult, a joke, etc.).  In ratifying an interactional text, 
participants presuppose that they have been enacting a particular type of interactional event. 
 I argue that speech can contribute to cognitive accomplishments through its interactional 
as well as its denotational functions.  The interactional texts presupposed or enacted in particular 
discursive interactions can make essential (intrinsic) contributions to the cognitive 
accomplishments that those acts of language use can facilitate, in two ways.  First, aspects of 
interactional text almost always make an essential contribution to denotational text, and the 
information represented in denotational text often makes important contributions to ecosocial 
systems.  I make this first argument in the rest of this section, with reference to linguistic forms 
called deictics.  Second, the social positioning enacted as interactional text in particular 
discursive interactions can itself provide patterns that contribute to ecosocial systems and thus 
facilitate cognition.  Sometimes speech contributes to the accomplishment of cognitive tasks not 
only through its denotational or representational content but also more directly through the 
interactional positioning the speech accomplishes.  I make this argument in the following two 
sections, by analyzing a particular classroom interaction. 
The first argument involves deictics.  Deictics are linguistic forms that occur in all known 
human languages, and they are ubiquitous in speech.  The category includes personal pronouns, 
demonstratives (English this/that), spatial and temporal adverbs (here/there, now/then), verb 
tense, aspects of certain verbs' meaning (e.g., come/go), and so on.  Deictics "single out objects 
of reference or address in terms of their relation to the current interactive context in which the 
utterance occurs" (Hanks, 1992:47).  Deictics presuppose some aspect of interactional text as the 
warrant or backing for their denotational value.  We provides an example.  For hearers to 
understand what a particular utterance of we refers to, they must know something about 
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presupposed social groups that include the speaker.  We presupposes a radial geometry centered 
on the speaker, with the speaker a member of some group.  People referred to as they lie beyond 
some boundary, while people referred to as we lie inside the boundary with the speaker.  Hearers 
can only understand what a particular token of we refers to by presupposing something about the 
relevant social groups in the speaker's world.  Relevant information will often include the 
structure of the larger society, including the ethnic identity, generational cohort or regional 
origin of the speaker, for example.  The particular  interactional alignments that may have been 
presupposed or created in the discursive interaction up to this point determine which of these 
presupposable social groupings will be relevant to fixing the denotational value of we in this 
particular instance of use.  The existence and ubiquity of deictics thus shows that in many cases 
interactional patterns (e.g., who belongs in the same social group as the speaker) are intrinsically 
related to the denotational meaning of language in use.  Without the interactional information, 
there would be no denotation. 
Hanks (1990), Irvine (1992, 1996) and Silverstein and Urban (1996) note that deictics' 
denotational meaning cannot be computed by plugging contextual information from the 
interactional event of speaking into presupposed models and rules.  Successful denotation is, 
instead, accomplished by using presupposed models and rules as resources for establishing 
denotational coherence in particular interactions.  We can see this in non-normative but 
denotationally successful cases like the "royal we."  So the information denoted or represented 
by any utterance that contains deictics both (1) depends on information from the interactional 
text—e.g., who is being presupposed as a member of the speaker's social group at the moment 
we is uttered—and (2) is a contingent accomplishment made by speaker and audience (Garfinkel, 
1967; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Hanks, 1990).  Coherent denotational text depends on coherent 
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interactional text, and coherent denotational text gets accomplished in particular discursive 
interactions.  Note that these two claims both differ from the one made in the following two 
sections, where I argue that interactional textual structure—apart from its contributions to 
denotational text—can also contribute to the ecosocial systems that facilitate cognition.  In other 
words, speech can contribute to cognitively-functional ecosocial systems in at least three ways:  
denotational text can contribute information; interactional text can contribute to the 
accomplishment of denotational text, as in the case of deictics, and the resulting denotational text 
can contribute information; and the social positioning that constitutes interactional text can by 
itself contribute to ecosocial systems, as described in the next two sections. 
Of course, the case of deictics shows that in actual discursive interactions neither 
denotational nor interactional text ever exists by itself, independent of the other.  Just as the 
denotational function of language depends on interactional structures, the interactional functions 
of language depend on denotational structures.  By virtue of referring to some social group that 
includes the speaker, for instance, a particular use of we can potentially create or reinforce 
solidarity among members of a group.  In a bid to create community among an ethnically diverse 
group of students, a teacher might refer to him or herself plus all the students as we.  If others in 
the class come to presuppose this usage, the very occurrence of this verbal pattern might be 
central to creating the desired community.  This use of we to create social solidarity would not 
happen unless the deictic denoted the relevant group.  Thus the denotational and interactional 
functions of deictics, and of language use more generally, depend on each other.  Successful use 
of deictics to denote depends on interactional patterns in the event of speaking, and successful 
use of deictics to create or modify interactional patterns depends on the denotational values that 
tokens of those forms have in use. 
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Deictics show that some interactional structures established through language use are 
intrinsically related to the denotational meaning of that language use.  And because ecosocial 
systems often depend on information communicated using the denotational function of language, 
some cognitive accomplishments will necessarily depend on interactional patterns partly created 
through speech.  This suggests that the interactional functions of speech do not form a separate 
layer of human activity that can be ignored in cognitive analyses.  The rest of this article argues 
that the interdependence between language's denotational and interactional functions can go far 
beyond deictics to more complex, emergent interactional-denotational structures.  In some cases, 
speakers create more extensive interactional structures through speech.  Like deictics, these 
structures both depend on the denotational value of that speech and contribute to it.  The case 
described below will show that sometimes these more complex interactional structures not only 
contribute to the denotational value of speech but also contribute more directly to the ecosocial 
system and the cognitive accomplishments that the speech makes possible. 
 
A Participant Example 
 This section describes a thirty-minute classroom conversation.  In this particular 
discursive interaction, teachers and students both accomplish a cognitive task and enact a 
complex interactional event.  I argue that the interactional positioning they enact makes 
important contributions to the ecosocial system that allows them to accomplish the cognitive 
task.  This section introduces the conversation and describes both the cognitive agenda set by the 
teachers and the interactional events created through the conversation.  The following section 
argues for the interdependence of the cognitive accomplishments made through and the 
interactional structure enacted in the classroom conversation. 
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 I have selected a classroom conversation for this analysis, in order to show that 
interactional patterns can make substantial contributions to cognition even in academic tasks.  
Lave (1993, 1996) and others have argued that cognitive tasks in school do not differ in kind 
from "informal" or practical cognitive tasks.  Even formal academic learning, Lave claims, 
depends on ecosocial systems that involve structures drawn from extra-mental tools and social 
practices.  This challenges the more common claim that academic cognitive tasks are often more 
"representation-hungry" (Clark &Toribio, 1994) and that people solve such tasks by relying 
more heavily on intra-mental representations.  The case described here shows that successful 
completion of academic cognitive tasks can partly depend on interactional and larger social 
patterns.  While there might well be a continuum of more and less representation-hungry tasks, 
we should not assume that academic tasks necessarily rely on fewer ecosocial components. 
 In order to show how interactional text in this classroom conversation facilitated the 
cognition accomplished there, we need a methodological approach to analyzing interactional 
text.  The modeling of interactional text that we do as analysts is what Silverstein (1993a) calls 
"denotationally explicit."  That is, later in this section I will do my best to compose a 
denotational text that explicitly describes the interactional event enacted by teachers and students 
in their discussion.  But in the real-time classroom interaction this particular interactional text 
was "denotationally implicit."  Teachers and students did not explicitly denote what they were 
doing to and with each other.  Instead, they used various cues in their speech to signal the 
interactional event they were enacting.  Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), Silverstein (1976, 1985, 
1998) and Wortham (1994, 1996; Wortham & Locher, 1996) describe how patterns of indexical 
cues in language can emerge and cohere, so as to establish one model of the interactional text as 
most plausible.  In many cases—like the classroom discussion under consideration—speakers 
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orient to such indexical cues and the interactional texts they support, but speakers do not 
consciously recognize or explicitly articulate the interactional text or the significance of 
particular cues.  In such cases, participants and analysts infer the interactional textual patterns 
that particular cues support by examining whether subsequent cues came to presuppose the same 
patterns as previous cues (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Goodwin, 1984; Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson, 1974; Silverstein, 1976). 
 An analyst's reading of an interactional text, like the one given here, is an interpretation 
that explains as many patterns in the data as possible.  The data in this case include primarily the 
transcribed conversation and also my ethnographic fieldnotes and experience with these teachers 
and students.  I argue that my interpretation of this interactional text is more plausible than other 
possible interpretations, because it makes salient and explains more robust patterns of indexical 
cues, denotational contents, and other facts about the context than other interpretations do.  As 
described by Silverstein (1985, 1998) and Wortham (1996; Wortham & Locher, 1996), 
interpretation of interactional text does not rely on an impressionistic gathering of cues and 
patterns that fit the analyst's account.  Instead, sophisticated analysts first identify all occurrences 
of cues that regularly play an important role in establishing interactional text.  Acceptable 
interpretations account for most of the patterns identified in this initial phase of data analysis.  
Space limitations prevent me from giving a full description of the analysis in this article.  See 
Wortham (1994) for a more detailed analysis of the indexical cues that support my interpretation 
of this particular discursive interaction. 
 The half-hour classroom conversation analyzed here took place in a ninth grade history 
class in an urban US school.  I did more than two years of ethnographic work in this school, and 
I observed this particular class about fifty times over one academic year.  See Wortham (1994) 
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for more extensive background information on the setting.  Two teachers are running this 
particular classroom discussion, Mr. Smith (abbreviated "MrS" in the transcripts) and Mrs. 
Bailey ("MsB").  They are both white and middle-class.  There are fifteen students: ten black 
girls, two black boys, two white girls and one white boy.  All the students who speak in this half-
hour discussion are black.  In preparation for this class session students have read selections 
from Plutarch's "Life of Lycurgus" (taken from Bailkey, 1987).  This text describes the ancient 
Spartan political system, in which the welfare of the whole society was placed above the welfare 
of the individual.  Sparta was ruled by a committee of elders, called "Ephors," who made 
decisions on behalf of the community.  In this classroom conversation the students object 
strongly to one particular Spartan practice.  Plutarch describes how, when a citizen had a baby, 
she had to bring the baby to the Ephors for judgment.  If they felt the child was sickly, such that 
it would likely be a burden on the society, the Ephors forced the mother to leave the infant 
outside to die of exposure. 
 The students object to this Spartan practice on both moral and rational grounds.  They 
claim it is immoral to kill innocent children, regardless of their physical health.  And they argue 
that it is irrational to make judgments about whether newborn children will grow to be sickly 
adults.  One student, Jasmine (abbreviated "JAS"), makes both arguments in the following 
excerpt.  (Transcription conventions are in the appendix.) 
MrS:             [        and if you bring someone in= 
JAS:  [[ 3 syll ] 
MrS: =there that isn't going to do their share as the wall    
of Sparta. you're giving that- that person, something 
  5  that could be used better bu- by someone else. I- I 
  sort of think that's perfectly right  [     if a baby= 
 JAS:                                                     [that's not- 
 MrS: =can't hack it you get rid of it. that's going to be a 
   problem in the future.= 
10 JAS: they- they not equal if- if she had a baby and hers  
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  lived and I had a baby and mine didn't. we not equal. 
 MsB: yeah you're right.  you didn't produce a healthy baby. 
 MrS: that's [right 
 JAS:   [how do you know that. they just say that one 
15  ain't healthy. and then lookit. mine probably grew up 
  to be taller and [ stronger 
 MrS:    [because they're the Spartan Ephors 
  [  who make a decision. the Ephors know what makes a= 
 JAS: [and [ 5 syll ] 
20 MrS:  =good Spartan because they're sixty years old and 
  they've seen an awful lot. and they know what makes a 
  good soldier. they've been in it from the time they 
  were seven. 
In order to make her arguments, Jasmine introduces herself as a hypothetical Spartan mother in 
lines 10-11.  She also nominates another student—"she," which according to my fieldnotes from 
the interaction refers to another student named Erika—as a second hypothetical Spartan mother.  
This hypothetical example and the topic of infanticide serve as the focus of the discussion for the 
next thirty minutes.  With her example at lines 10-11, Jasmine argues that the Spartan practice is 
immoral.  She claims that a mother whose baby is killed is being treated unequally.  At lines 14-
16 Jasmine also uses the example to argue that the Spartan practice was irrational: her apparently 
sickly newborn, she claims, might grow up to be healthier than Erika's good-looking newborn.  
By killing a child who might turn out to be healthy, the Spartans are defeating their own goal of 
building a stronger society. 
 Despite the fact that the teachers give counter-arguments to both of Jasmine's claims (at 
lines 12-13 and 17-23), I suspect that Jasmine's example pleases the teachers.  Evidence for this 
comes from their tone of voice and from my notes about their animation at this point in the 
discussion, as well as the fact that they worked to maintain this example as the topic for thirty 
minutes.  I know from my year-long interaction with them that these teachers enjoy having 
students involved in conceptual arguments, and in Jasmine's example they see not only evidence 
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of student engagement but also an opportunity to further their pedagogical aims for the class.  I 
argue that they have three cognitive goals for this classroom discussion.  First, they want 
students to understand the reasoning behind the Spartans' practice of infanticide.  They believe 
that this practice is partly rational, and they want students to understand how reasonable people 
could have justified that practice to themselves.  Strong evidence for this first pedagogical goal 
comes from the teacher's repeated attempts to defend the Spartan system, over the thirty-minute 
discussion.  I also observed these teachers, on many occasions over the entire academic year, 
playing devil's advocate in this way to get students to reflect more deeply on the plausible and 
implausible aspects of an unfamiliar practice or argument.  They consistently tried to overcome 
students' claims that alien practices are bad or wrong simply because these practices are different 
from ours.  In the passage above, Jasmine moves beyond such a simple argument.  The teachers 
pattern has been to probe more complex arguments like Jasmine's, in order to explore what might 
be reasonable and unreasonable about the alien practice. 
 These teachers strive to find reasonableness within alien practices because they want 
students to learn from history things that might be relevant to our lives today.  Thus their second 
goal in this discussion is for students to use the extreme sociocentrism of the Spartan case to 
understand the general question that all societies face—namely, to what extent should citizens 
subordinate their individual desires for the good of the state?  The teachers' third goal is to help 
students reflect on similarities between the Spartans' and contemporary US society's goals.  From 
my conversations with them, and from their behavior later in this class discussion, I know that 
the teachers believe Spartans shared at least some goals and beliefs with contemporary 
Americans.  They seize on Jasmine's example, and later in the discussion introduce other cases 
drawn from contemporary US society, in order to help students discover goals and beliefs that 
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we and the Spartans share—even though we no longer practice infanticide.  By helping the 
students see these common goals, they intend to help students understand both how the Spartan 
practice of infanticide might have been reasonable in some respects and how all societies face 
questions about furthering the common good. 
 In addition to their persistence in pursuing this example and the larger concepts it 
illustrates, further evidence that the teachers did in fact hold these pedagogical goals comes from 
the educational philosophy that these teachers subscribe to.  Following Adler (1982) and others, 
they ask students to read "great books" from diverse cultural traditions (cf. Wortham, 1994, 
1995).  According to this educational philosophy, students will see in the great books universal 
human issues that will illuminate their own lives.  Thus the teachers approach the text about 
Sparta with the expectation that it will be relevant to important questions that contemporary 
societies and the students themselves face. 
 From the teachers' point of view, then, this classroom discussion will be cognitively 
successful insofar as the students come to understand three things: how Spartans could have 
convinced themselves that infanticide was reasonable; how all societies must balance individual 
desires with the common good; and how contemporary US society also makes some decisions to 
promote the common good at the expense of individual desires, just like the Spartans.  It is not 
clear from the evidence presented below that the students ever understand how infanticide might 
have been reasonable.  And there is only limited evidence that the students understand the 
abstract point about all societies—although this is a longer-term goal that the teachers probably 
did not expect to reach in one class.  But there is substantial evidence in the conversation that 
several students do understand the analogy between the US and Sparta, with respect to the issue 
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of promoting the common good.  I argue that both the denotational and the interactional texts 
make essential contributions to this understanding. 
 Immediately after Jasmine gives her example, the teachers try to persuade her that her 
baby will in fact be a burden on the larger society.  At the end of the excerpt given above (in 
lines 17-23), Mr. Smith claims that the Spartan Ephors are experienced enough to tell which 
children will grow to be a burden on the society and which will not.  As I have just argued, the 
teachers’ larger pedagogical goal at this point is to convince students that Spartan practices 
might have been reasonable in some respects, by helping students see that concern for the social 
good makes sense.  Mrs. Bailey continues the teachers' argument, by imagining the burden 
Jasmine's unproductive baby will become in the future. 
 JAS: if she had a baby and- and hers lived and mine died
  we not equal. and if they want it to be- everybody to 
  be equal then I [ should've got to kept ] mine too. 
 MsB: what- wait a second. you're baby's going to grow up and 
  5  be this unhealthy runt.  [         her baby's going to grow= 
 STS:   [hahaha 
 MsB: =up and be: healthy 
 JAS: I'm equal to her then 
 MsB: yeah you're equal. but you know take it twenty years in 
10  the future. her baby's going to have to do what for 
   your baby. your baby's going to do what. lay around. 
 ST : hahahaha drinking beer 
 STS: haha[haha                  haha      hahaha           haha 
 MsB:   [drinking beer. eating their- their bean soup. 
Mrs. Bailey imagines the consequences, if Spartan society had favored the individual good of 
sickly children over the good of the whole.  Jasmine the hypothetical Spartan mother might have 
been happy to have her child saved, but the whole society would end up supporting this sickly 
child later. 
---------------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------------------------------------- 
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 Figure 1 represents the rudimentary denotational and interactional patterns that are 
emerging at this point in the discursive interaction.  The outermost rectangle represents the 
interactional event taking place among teachers and students.  When Jasmine gives her example, 
teachers and students occupy their traditional roles in having a classroom discussion, with the 
teachers teaching and the students learning about ancient history.  The teachers have also 
positioned themselves, as "devil's advocates," as if they favored Spartan practices.  And Jasmine 
has positioned herself against Spartan practices.  This apparent conflict between the teachers and 
Jasmine over the morality of infanticide might be merely an academic device the teachers are 
using to illuminate the subject matter, or it might signal a deeper interactional conflict.  
 The two embedded rectangles in Figure 1 represent aspects of the denotational text.  The 
box labeled "textbook" represents the social roles described by the textbook and discussed by 
teachers and students earlier in the classroom discussion.  The box labeled "example" represents 
the analogous three-part role structure described by Jasmine in her hypothetical example.  The 
dotted lines between the two embedded boxes represent the analogy between the example and 
the text.  The teachers and Jasmine are using the hypothetical example of Jasmine's baby as a 
"base" and the case of Sparta as a "target" (Gentner, 1982; Markman, 1997).  They set up the 
example to involve a one-to-one mapping from base to target with respect to the three entities 
represented in the diagram.  They are discussing the relations among these entities in the 
hypothetical case of Jasmine's baby, with the teachers hoping to infer by analogy how the target 
case of ancient Sparta might have been partly reasonable and Jasmine hoping to infer that 
Spartan infanticide was unreasonable and immoral. 
 So far, then, the teachers occupy two interactional roles:  as teachers responsible for 
teaching the subject matter and as devil's advocates who might favor infanticide for sickly 
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infants.  There are thus two interactional texts in play: a standard classroom discussion between 
teachers and students and a (mock) disagreement between the teachers and Jasmine.  But there is 
some evidence even at this early point that a third interactional text is emerging as well.  The 
example of Jasmine's baby includes some of the speakers participating in the narrating event 
itself (Jasmine and Erika, so far), and is thus what I have called a "participant example" 
(Wortham, 1994).  This sort of example makes salient the implications that denotational text can 
have for interactional text, because such examples double the roles of certain participants.  
Jasmine, for instance, now has three identities in this classroom conversation—as a student 
participating in class discussion, as an opponent of Spartan infanticide and as a hypothetical 
Spartan mother.  As we will see below, and as described at length in Wortham (1994), speakers 
can make comments about participants' hypothetical characters within a participant example and 
implicitly comment on actual participants.  In this case, comments about Jasmine's character as a 
hypothetical Spartan have implications for the interactional position of Jasmine the student 
herself.  In other words, aspects of the denotational text that Jasmine introduces with her 
example become relevant to understanding her position in a third layer of the interactional text. 
 We can begin to see the example's interactional implications by recognizing the two types 
of relationships it includes.  First is the relationship between the two hypothetical Spartan 
mothers—one of whom must leave her unhealthy-looking child to die of exposure, while the 
other gets to keep her child.  This relationship has various characteristics, but as the example 
gets discussed further we will see that teachers and students increasingly presuppose this to be a 
relationship between unprivileged and privileged.  The other relationship is between the mothers 
and the Ephors.  This is a relationship between the subordinate and the powerful.  While fleshing 
out the analogy between Sparta and the example, which is work they do as part of the 
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denotational text, Jasmine and the teachers discuss these relationships.  Jasmine claims that the 
Ephors unjustly use their power to privilege Erika (at lines 1-3), while the teachers argue that the 
Ephors justly use their power and that Jasmine deserves her unprivileged position because she 
had an unhealthy baby (lines 4-5, 9-11). 
 These two types of relationships that get represented as part of the denotational text, as it 
turns out, also have implications for one layer of the interactional text that teachers and students 
enact.  As the interaction proceeds the teachers sometimes enact the role of the powerful, one 
group of students sometimes enacts the role of the privileged, and another group of students 
(including Jasmine)  sometimes enacts the role of the unprivileged.  The cues that support this 
reading of the interactional text begin in the last passage presented.  What sort of person would 
stereotypically say "your baby's going to do what? lay around....drinking beer"?  This accusation 
might index contemporary welfare critics, who often decry the alleged laziness of the welfare 
recipients whom taxpayers support.  (The utterance indexically presupposes this social group, 
because members of the group characteristically speak in this way; cf. Peirce (1955) and 
Silverstein (1976) for a technical account of indexical presupposition).  This particular index has 
the potential to influence and complicate the interaction among teachers and students, because 
the students come from a social group often stereotyped as lazy welfare recipients—lower class 
blacks. 
 Wortham (1994) argues that as the discussion proceeds and the interactional text unfolds, 
the teachers do in fact align themselves with contemporary US welfare critics.  Furthermore, the 
passage above represents the beginning of a pattern in which the students' own social position 
becomes analogous to that of unprivileged Spartans.  In addition to the denotational analogy 
between Jasmine's example and the case of Sparta, students enact a social position analogous to 
 24
the unprivileged Spartans' and teachers enact a position analogous to the Ephors'.  In the 
classroom and in contemporary America, just as in Sparta, we have relations between the 
privileged and unprivileged and between the powerful and the subordinate.  Like Spartan 
mothers who must submit their children to be judged, students must submit to teachers' 
judgments.  And, as Spartan society did to unhealthy babies, American society often turns its 
back on the students' social group (lower-class blacks).  This analogy begins to develop in the 
passage above when Mrs. Bailey characterizes Jasmine's baby as naturally inferior (an 
"unhealthy runt"), unproductive ("lying around") and intemperate.  These terms index a 
particular type of social identity for the child and thus for its mother.  Although Mrs. Bailey is 
explicitly talking about Sparta, her characterization of Jasmine's baby as a lazy drunkard begins 
to sound like the contemporary American stereotype for some lower-class black welfare 
recipients. 
 I am not claiming that Mrs. Bailey's brief characterization of Jasmine's baby in this 
passage definitively positions her as a welfare critic and Jasmine as the type of "welfare mother" 
that welfare critics complain about.  First, as described above, there are at least two other 
interactional texts in play: students and teachers are having a classroom discussion, with the 
standard goal of helping students learn the subject matter; and the teachers are playing devil's 
advocate by defending the Spartan practice of infanticide, and thus they are engaged in a (mock) 
argument with Jasmine.  I claim that, along with these other two interactional texts, teachers and 
students might also be starting to presuppose an interactional text that positions the teachers as 
welfare critics.  Second, the few cues in the passage above do not suffice to establish this third, 
"welfare critic" interactional text.  The welfare critic and welfare mother social positions would 
have to be presupposed by many subsequent cues before analysts or participants could conclude 
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that this third interactional text is in fact being enacted.  The rest of this section, and the more 
comprehensive analysis in Wortham (1994), provide evidence from the transcript that many 
subsequent cues do in fact presuppose these social and interactional issues surrounding welfare. 
 This third interactional text, which positions the teachers as welfare critics and Jasmine as 
a welfare mother, involves an analogy between the relations in Sparta and role relations in the 
contemporary US.  The teachers' argument that the Ephors were justified in killing unhealthy 
infants might presuppose that the teachers themselves are welfare critics who would feel justified 
in cutting off welfare recipients' benefits.  I emphasize that this analogy between the students' 
and teachers' actual interactional positions and the social positions represented in the example 
differs fundamentally from the analogy between the example and Sparta.  The analogy between 
the example and Sparta as represented in Figure 1, maps similarities from one denoted realm to 
another.  The teachers and Jasmine use these similarities to pursue their arguments about the 
reasonableness and morality of Spartan practices.  The emerging analogy between students' and 
teachers' own interactional positions and the example maps similarities between an enacted 
realm and a denoted realm.  I will argue in the next section that this sort of analogy between 
enactment and denotation allows interactional textual structure to contribute to the cognitive 
accomplishments made through this classroom conversation. 
 With the addition of these new interactional positions for Jasmine and the teachers, they 
now each have three interactional identities that have been and might continue to be 
presupposed.  The teachers are responsible for helping students learn the subject matter.  They 
might be advocates for infanticide or some other sort of social engineering like the Spartans'.  
And they might be positioning themselves as welfare critics who oppose contemporary US social 
welfare policies.  Jasmine is a student learning the subject matter.  She opposes the Spartans' 
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infanticide.  And she might be getting positioned as a stereotyped welfare recipient.  Each of 
these identities or positions is in play during the classroom conversation.  The teachers are 
playing devil's advocate to prod students into thinking further about Sparta.  But I argue that they 
are also positioning themselves as welfare critics, as shown by patterns of indexical cues that 
increasingly come to presuppose this positioning. 
 The following excerpt occurs a few minutes after the one presented above. 
 MsB:              yeah but see you're- you- but that's the  
  [    hitch isn't it? you've got this baby that's not= 
 JAS:  [I'm sayin'- 
 JAS:    [I know. so [ 3 syll ] 
5 MsB: =healthy [and you're afraid's going to go in the army,  
  ((* breathless inhalation *)) and why should the rest 
  of us [s-      support your baby. 
 STS:  [hahaha 
 ST?:  are you saying= 
10 JAS: if they wanted them to be equal then even if my child 
  was retarded or whatever he should go into the army too
 
If we examine this excerpt for its interactional implications, one utterance stands out: Mrs. 
Bailey's "why should the rest of us support your baby?" at lines 6-7.  This indexes welfare critics 
again, because it expresses a sentiment often voiced by welfare critics.  Note Mrs. Bailey's use of 
us in this utterance.  For the first time Mrs. Bailey includes herself in the example, in a group 
opposed to Jasmine's.  She attributes a definite social identity to Jasmine's baby: he is an 
unproductive freeloader, someone who needs to be supported by society.  Mrs. Bailey and her 
social group—whoever is included in us—are taxpayers forced to support such people.  Here 
Mrs. Bailey more explicitly positions herself, and implicitly Mr. Smith and other taxpayers, in a 
role analogous to the Ephors'.  In both the text and the example the Ephors refuse to expend 
resources on unhealthy babies.  Analogously, Mrs. Bailey herself seems to resent spending tax 
money on "unproductive" children. 
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 I do not deny that Mrs. Bailey is playing devil's advocate here.  She continues to defend 
Spartan infanticide, in order to reach her pedagogical goals.  But she also raises a charged and 
salient issue from her own and the students' lives—the use of workers' tax payments to support 
non-working people.  Given that many of these students come from families on welfare, and that 
many working people resent paying taxes to support welfare recipients, by saying "why should 
the rest of us support your baby" Mrs. Bailey also potentially brings the social dispute between 
welfare critics and welfare recipients into play.  Paralinguistic cues also seem to indicate Mrs. 
Bailey's commitment to the issue in this passage: both the tempo and volume of her speech 
increase markedly while she is making this point about supporting unproductive people.  Both 
this passage, and the earlier one that described Jasmine's child as someone who would lie around 
drinking beer later in life, seem to presuppose the welfare-critic interactional text.  If subsequent 
utterances continue to presuppose that teachers might be positioning themselves as welfare 
critics and students might be getting positioned as stereotyped welfare recipients, and the 
analysis in Wortham (1994) shows that they do, analysts and participants should be more likely 
to conclude that this third layer of the interactional text is in fact going on. 
---------------------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ---------------------------------------- 
 Figure 2 represents the discursive interaction at this point.  Utterances from the last two 
excerpts are included, utterances that Mrs. Bailey uses to describe Jasmine's hypothetical baby.  
As discussed above, these utterances index groups that both teachers and students recognize 
from their own society: welfare critics and stereotyped welfare recipients.  Given this, the 
question becomes where teachers and students themselves stand with respect to these 
presupposed groups.  The last passage indicates that Mrs. Bailey aligns herself with the welfare 
critics, as an irate taxpayer.  The fact that most of these students are lower class blacks also 
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makes it possible that they themselves are being aligned—through the too-common US 
stereotype—with Jasmine's hypothetical, unproductive baby.  The dotted lines between the 
utterances in the "example" box and the "interactional text" box represent the indexical 
presuppositions carried by those utterances.  As we have seen, a pattern of indexical cues, in 
these utterances and several others analyzed in Wortham (1994), has emerged to position 
teachers and students within a recognizable interactional text.  We can summarize this 
interactional text in this way: the teachers inhabit the role of welfare critics and complain about 
(stereotyped) unproductive welfare recipients like the students.  Note that this interactional text 
includes positions that get enacted in the larger society, positions that the teachers and students 
easily fall into.  These teachers are not hostile, racist people in general, but they and the students 
do fall into a racist interactional text that comes to speak (or act) through them. 
 While this third interactional text is emerging, the teachers are still trying to convince 
Jasmine and other students that infanticide might be reasonable in some respects.   They have a 
hard time convincing students that it would be acceptable to kill Jasmine's hypothetical baby, 
however.  As they confess later in the discussion, the teachers themselves do not believe that 
infanticide is acceptable either.  But they do want the students to see that Sparta's concern for the 
social good—while perhaps taken to an untenable extreme by the Spartans themselves—is 
nonetheless a reasonable goal.  In trying to convince students of this, Mrs. Bailey introduces a 
third analogous realm into the denotational text, this one drawn from contemporary US society.  
Here the teachers get to their third goal for the class—to help students understand that the 
contemporary US should also sometimes favor the common good over individual desires.  Mrs. 
Bailey argues that we have swung too far away from the Spartan model, allowing individuals to 
do whatever they want at the expense of the common good. 
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 MsB: I mean- what is the problem with this Jasmine. we're- what do we 
do. Let anybody mate with everybody else in our society. We've got 
all of these crack babies. And all of these- you know babies that are 
born to twelve-year-olds and ar- are premature and therefore have all 
  5  these problems. we have mental incompetents mating with mental  
incompetents producing children. and going back to our discussions on  
the [2 syll] and- and Aristotle's Politics, I'm tired of footing the bill for 
these people. if you can have a healthy baby fine. But why should I have to 
contribute to the support of your retarded kids and you just keep 
10 producing them.  
 ST: go:d. 
 
Here Mrs. Bailey shifts away from the (denotational) analogy between Jasmine's hypothetical 
baby and ancient Sparta.  She begins to construct a new analogy between Jasmine's hypothetical 
baby and contemporary US society.  In some respects, Mrs. Bailey's comments here still pertain 
to the hypothetical example of Jasmine's baby, as we can see in lines 8-9 when she refers to 
"your" kids.  Jasmine's example—or an expanded version of it where the kids are "retarded"—is 
not only analogous to Sparta but also to some contemporary US social practices.  The new 
analogous realm here must be the contemporary US, because "crack babies" are a distinctively 
modern phenomenon.  Mrs. Bailey seems to be arguing that excessive concern for the rights of 
individuals (to have crack babies whenever they want, for example) has high costs to the 
common good.  She is using the contemporary US here as a new base for an analogy.  She and 
Mr. Smith have tried to argue by analogy, using the base of Jasmine's example, that Spartan 
infanticide was partly reasonable.  But the students have not accepted this argument.  So Mrs. 
Bailey introduces another analogous realm, from the contemporary US, in a second attempt to 
show how Spartan infanticide was rational insofar as it was meant to serve the common good. 
 In order to make this argument, Mrs. Bailey first points out the problems that 
contemporary US society has, because we do not pursue the common good as vigorously as 
Sparta did.  In the last passage, she describes how contemporary US practices lead us to have 
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many unproductive citizens who burden the society (lines 2-6).  By letting these individuals 
pursue their own desires, without regard for the common good, contemporary US society makes 
a mistake.  By analogy, the students might infer that Spartan attempts to promote the common 
good are not as unreasonable as they might seem.  There is no evidence here that the students 
themselves make this inference, however.  In fact, the student's response at line 11 seems more 
plausibly a reaction to the position of welfare critic that Mrs. Bailey continues to presuppose for 
herself in the interactional text at lines 7-10. 
 Then Mrs. Bailey goes on to argue that we in the contemporary US also pursue the 
common good, although in different ways than the Spartans.  Thus she sketches out the analogy 
between the US and Sparta further, by showing how both societies try to promote the common 
good in their own ways. 
 MsB: yeah prosperity is money riches wealth. OK. how do- how  
  do we become a rich, nation. a powerful nation. 
 CAN: work hard? work for it. 
 MsB: you've got [to work for it. 
  5 CAS:  [[ 4 syll ] good education 
 MsB: you've got to have a good education. why. 
 
Here Cassandra suggests a contemporary American practice designed to improve citizens' 
productivity: education.  Mrs. Bailey pursues this point, because it fits her argument.  Like the 
Spartans, we are concerned about the common good.  We are not willing to kill children who 
might be unproductive, so we provide education to help all children join the economic system 
and contribute to the society.  A few minutes further into the discussion, Mrs. Bailey and Mr. 
Smith more explicitly state their argument.   
  MsB:  when- when I- we want a society of 
  productive individuals but we also say anyone that's 
  born has a right to survive. (1.0) K- now what do we 
  want to do with all these surviving individuals.  what's
  5  in the best interest in our society? 
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  CAS: use them. 
  MsB: to use them to make them productive.  which means we 
  might have to do a few things in between right?  we 
  might have to give them an education.  we might have to 
10  also what?  (3.0) job training. create jo:b programs. 
  MrS: make them healthy.  (1.0) 
  MsB: give pre-natal care. 
  MrS: make certain they have homes. 
   ST?: no 
15  STS: [hahahahaha haha 
 MsB: [talk about sex education in- in- in classes so 
  that kids are not producing children at an- at too 
  early an age.  (1.0) 
  CAS: talk about diseases. 
20  MsB: talk about diseases.  set up health plans.  You see we're 
  about the same thing as the Spartans are about in some 
  ways. except we started with a different sense of who 
  should live. we're trying to make people productive 
  too. 
 
Here the teachers spell out the differences and similarities between Sparta and the contemporary 
US.  They were willing to kill sickly babies, while we are not.  But the Spartan practice of 
infanticide can be understood with reference to a goal both societies share: to have citizens that 
contribute to the social good.  Contemporary US society invests resources toward this goal, 
through education and social welfare programs. 
 At this point the teachers try to close the discussion of Jasmine's example and Spartan 
infanticide.  As described in Wortham (1994), the students resist this closure and continue to 
protest against the injustice of killing unhealthy babies.  I argue in Wortham (1994) that this 
continued resistance provides further evidence that the students are presupposing or orienting to 
the interactional text that involves welfare critics and stereotyped welfare recipients.  But the 
teachers override the students' objections and go on to another topic.  The fact that the teachers 
chose the discussion at this point likely indicates that they have accomplished at least some of 
their pedagogical goals.  They did not get students to admit that Spartan infanticide was 
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reasonable in any way.  But they did show students how US society tries to promote the common 
good, just like Sparta.  At least one student (Cassandra) seems to understand this point, as 
indicated by her contributions to the last passage. 
 When she introduces the third analogous realm of the contemporary US into the 
denotational text, Mrs. Bailey also continues to presuppose the "welfare critic" interactional text.  
In fact, the new denoted information allows her and Mr. Smith to flesh out this interactional text 
further.  Note that, by this point in the discursive interaction, the teachers have dropped their 
roles as devil's advocates.  They now have only two interactional roles in play: as teachers 
responsible for the subject matter and as welfare critics.  Their positions as welfare critics 
become presupposed even more strongly in the following excerpt, which picks up the discussion 
right after the six-line excerpt presented on page 31 top. 
 MsB: yeah prosperity is money riches wealth. OK. how do- how  
  do we become a rich, nation. a powerful nation. 
           CAN: work hard? work for it. 
 MsB: you've got [to work for it. 
5 CAS:  [ [ 4 syll ] good education 
 MsB: you've got to have a good education. why. 
  MR: like some um, like some of them Asian women are taking 
  over 'cause they are smart. 
  STS: Asians Asian girls hnh 
10 MsB: because they work hard? 
  STS: [ 2 sec overlapping comments ] 
 MsB: they just don't work harder than you do. 
  MR:  they work hard but they smart too. 
  JAS: they have to be smart to learn all them signs. 
15  STS: hahaha [[ overlapping comments and laughter ] 
 MrS:    [if- if that's the case Martha. if that's- if 
  that's the case because they're smart and they work 
  hard, then because you're not smart you don't work hard 
  maybe [we should throw you in the glen early to give= 
20  ST?:  [ [ 6 syll ] 
 MrS: =them the benefit? 
  ST?: [ 2 syll ] that smart 
          CAN: there's this- there's this boy I know he just came  
  from- India and stuff and I swear °you know° he- he 
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25  learned how to speak English in about a month. like 
  this. ((* snaps fingers *)) smart. 
 MrS: so why should we waste time with you. I think we'd best  
  go to him and work with him. and he'll be our best  
  future citizen.= 
30 MsB: make them the Helots. 
  STS: [hnhhnh 
 MrS: [that's right. I like that idea. 
 
Analyzed just in terms of denotational text, this passage fleshes out Mrs. Bailey's argument about 
the common good.  But the third analogous realm introduced in the denotational text, which 
helps the teacher to make an argument about the rationality of various social practices, also has 
interactional implications.  The students nominate contemporary Asians as productive members 
of US society in a position analogous to Erika's healthy baby (at lines 7ff.).  Asians in the US, 
like Erika's baby, will allegedly work hard and contribute to the society.  Less talented and 
diligent students will not work as hard and will not contribute as much.  When we consider the 
implications of this segment for the interactional text, it becomes clear that this passage 
continues to presuppose the "welfare critic" interactional positioning that started earlier.  The 
students themselves contribute to this, but the interactional text nonetheless positions them in 
stereotyped and insidious ways.  (Because they act against their on interest in this way, I 
conclude that they are not aware of the interactional implications their comments might have.) 
 The passage contains several clues that the students' and teachers' own social positions—
and, more generally, issues surrounding race relations and welfare programs in contemporary 
America—are also interactionally in play.  In lines 16-29, Mr. Smith connects the relationship 
between these (black) students and Asian students to the relationship between Jasmine's and 
Erika's hypothetical babies.  He does this, for example, by talking about throwing these students 
"in the glen" at line 19.  His use of this phrase indexically presupposes Plutarch's use of the same 
phrase, when Plutarch says that unfit Spartan babies were left outside "in a glen" to die.  Mr. 
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Smith presupposes an analogy here between the relationship of Asian to black students and the 
relationship of healthy to unhealthy Spartan babies.  In doing so, he positions students like 
Jasmine as less well endowed: Asian students are smart and they work hard; other students are 
dumb and lazy.  He also follows Lycurgus in claiming that society should turn its back on under-
endowed children. 
 Mrs. Bailey's comment at line 30—"make them the Helots"—captures and summarizes 
the implications of this passage for the interactional text.  To understand this comment we first 
need another piece of background information.  The Helots were serfs or slaves who farmed the 
land around Sparta, allowing Spartan citizens a life of leisure.  Helots outnumbered Spartans ten 
to one, so citizens always feared a revolt.  The reading describes two ways Spartan citizens 
reduced the threat: they periodically snuck out of the city at night and murdered Helot men; and 
they invited strong, eloquent Helots into the city on the pretense of honoring their talents, then 
they killed them. 
---------------------------------------- Insert Figure 3 about here ---------------------------------------- 
 Figure 3 includes this information in its representation of the denotational text.  The class 
discusses three social groups in Sparta: those in power (Ephors), the privileged (citizens) and the 
unprivileged (Helots).  The figure makes clear that the example of Jasmine's baby, and the 
analogous realm including Asian students and contemporary US society, both involve analogous 
three-part sets of social groups.  Within the denotational text, then, there are three analogous 
realms:  the textbook, the example and contemporary US social relations.  As discussed above, 
the teachers use these analogies to argue that the US and Sparta have some things in common—
particularly the goal of defending the common good. 
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 The figure also represents a fourth realm that has the same structure as the other three—
the "welfare critic" interactional text that establishes social positions for teachers and students.  
The figure shows that the teachers and students themselves occupy roles analogous to those in 
Sparta and the example.  In discussing how society should treat the unprivileged, teachers and 
students are not only discussing past, hypothetical events.  They also position themselves with 
regard to contemporary questions about how powerful and privileged people (like the teachers) 
should treat unprivileged people (like some of the students).  As represented in the figure, the 
teachers end up siding with welfare critics and discouraging over-investment in the unprivileged. 
 Mrs. Bailey encapsulates this interactional pattern when she proposes making the students 
Helots.   With this comment she casts white teachers and Asian students as superior to black 
students, in the same way that Spartan Ephors and privileged citizens were superior to Helots.  
This both points out black students' subordinate position and provides a potential justification for 
it—in terms of inferior capacities.  Expressed bluntly, in the interactional text the teachers' 
positioning communicates the following to the students: (1) productive people like us are tired of 
paying taxes for "freeloaders" like you; (2) you are members of an unproductive social group 
that does not deserve equal rights; (3) those in power like us will decide which of you are 
potentially productive and deserve to enjoy the benefits of society.  (This obviously summarizes 
thirty minutes of interactional work coarsely; cf. Wortham (1994) for more detailed analysis.)  I 
emphasize that none of these three "points" is denoted.  Teachers and students enact an 
interactional event that communicates these things through the interactional positions 
presupposed and created by their speech. 
 So the analogy between the fourth realm represented in Figure 3—the interactional text—
and the other three denoted realms differs fundamentally from the other analogies.  Instead of 
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using one representation to infer things about another, the teachers used a representation to 
facilitate their interactional positioning.  The teachers aligned themselves with the indexically 
presupposed group of welfare critics, and they positioned students alongside the indexically 
presupposed group of stereotyped welfare recipients, by using the three-part relationship 
(between the powerful, privileged subordinates and unprivileged subordinates) that was set up in 
the denotational text.  The academic content of the classroom discussion—which itself 
composed a coherent denotational text—contributes essential organization to the interactional 
text.  But the interactional text is not simply derived from denotational text.  Teachers and 
students did not denote all the interactional positioning that they presupposed about welfare 
critics and stereotyped welfare recipients.  Instead, they enacted this interactional text through 
the deployment of indexical cues.  The next section argues that this enacted interactional text 
contributed to students' understanding of the subject matter. 
 
Cognition and Enactment 
 I argue that the analogy between denotational and interactional text in this case does more 
than help the teachers to accomplish their interactional positioning.  The interactional text in the 
classroom discussion of Spartan infanticide also makes essential contributions to the academic 
understanding accomplished in that discussion.  In order to make this argument, "academic 
understanding" must mean more than 'accurate mental representations' or 'denotationally explicit 
accounts of the subject matter.'  Academic understanding in a classroom discussion occurs when 
people participate competently in intelligible academic discourse about an issue.  Such 
competent participation inevitably involves some accurate mental representations and some 
denotationally explicit talk about the subject matter.  But at least in some cases conversation that 
illuminates academic content depends on mental, denotational and interactional structures for its 
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coherence.  As Greeno et al. (1998), Lave (1993) and others have argued, academic success 
requires competent participation in academic practices—not simply the production of 
decontextualized representations or denotational accounts. 
 The Spartan infanticide discussion shows how denotational and interactional text 
interrelate so as to illuminate the academic content raised by the teachers.  The teachers wanted 
students to understand why Spartan infanticide might have been reasonable in some respects.  
Their strategy was to show students that Spartans were concerned for the common good more 
than for individual rights.  In order to communicate this more general point, the teachers 
introduced an analogy with contemporary US practices like compulsory education.  They wanted 
students to understand that we are also concerned to promote the common good and that our 
society might err in over-emphasizing individual rights at the expense of the common good.  The 
teachers made many denotationally explicit comments that contributed to these points, but they 
and the students also enacted interactional patterns that contributed. 
 Spartans discarded unhealthy infants for the common good.  In the US, we discard 
allegedly unproductive citizens by denying them a decent education and other opportunities to 
succeed.  Students and teachers enacted this pattern from the contemporary US, by falling into 
the roles of (stereotyped) lazy, black welfare recipients and welfare critics.  Spartan society 
invested in privileged members—like healthy infants and Spartan citizens—and discarded or 
exploited allegedly unproductive infants and Helots.  In the US, we also sometimes distinguish 
between privileged and unprivileged members.  Students and teachers enacted this contemporary 
pattern as well, by falling into the roles of allegedly "model" minorities and "unproductive" 
minorities—whom we often support differentially by sending them to different tracks in school, 
for instance.  Teachers and students fell easily into the roles of welfare critics and stereotyped 
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welfare recipients—and into the roles of teachers who appreciate diligent Asian students and 
black students who either resent or envy Asian students' academic success—because they often 
see these interactional positions adopted around them.  These role positions and their associated 
racist stereotypes are part of our culture.  That is, people in the US regularly presuppose or enact 
them (unfortunately).  Many of the students, and perhaps in some respects the teachers as well, 
do not mentally represent the nuances of the welfare debate and of black-Asian relations in the 
contemporary US.  But they know how to enact these relations 
 The classroom discussion created an analogy between ancient Sparta and the 
contemporary US in part because teachers and students enacted the three-part role structure of 
powerful-privileged-underprivileged that occurs in Sparta and in our own societies.  Teachers 
and students did denote some aspects of this three-part role structure, but others they simply 
enacted.  So the teachers reached their goal of sharing commonalities between the US and Sparta 
in part as they and the students enacted the positions of powerful/disempowered and 
privileged/unprivileged.  In other words, the analogy between the interactional text and the three 
denotational textual realms allowed the interactional text to facilitate cognition.  The "base" in 
the analogy was enacted as much as it was represented, and the enacted positions allowed 
students to understand similarities between the US and Sparta. 
 The teachers likely did not intend the interactional text to do the work it did.  Like most 
of us who participate in academic conversation, they probably expected the denotational text to 
do all the work.  Nonetheless, students understood something about why Sparta discarded 
apparently unhealthy infants, because they enacted how the contemporary US also pushes aside 
some citizens by judging them as unproductive and (e.g.) denying them access to decent 
education.  Students understood how all societies must demand that some individuals sacrifice 
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for the good of the whole, because they enacted how people like them often must give up their 
aspirations because the society does not nurture and use their talents. 
 In these last two sentences, I use "understood" in a broad sense.  I doubt that students or 
teachers mentally represented or could have explicitly formulated the full analogy between the 
denotational and interactional texts.  (I wish that I had been fully aware of the interactional text 
myself as I observed this class session, because then I would certainly have interviewed them 
afterwards to find out how much they could articulate.  Unfortunately, I sat through the whole 
discussion without any conscious awareness of what was going on.  Analyses like the one 
presented in this article often require transcription and reflection for weeks or months after the 
event).  I find it more plausible to model teachers' and students' understanding of "unproductive" 
citizens in the US and Sparta as an emergent property of an ecosocial system—one that includes 
the denotational information communicated by language, some mental representations, the larger 
social patterns that teachers and students participate in and implicitly recognize, and the 
interactional text created through their interaction.  In other words, both the interactional text and 
the denotational text were necessary but not sufficient for helping students understand the 
analogy between the US and Sparta.  The cognitive accomplishments in this conversation were 
facilitated in part by the interactional enactments of the three role positions of powerful, 
privileged, and unprivileged groups of people.  Evidence for this comes from the fact that 
students and teachers participated in and oriented to the interactional text that involved welfare 
critics.  Students as well as teachers produced indexical cues that presupposed this interactional 
text, and in doing so they participated fluently in the partly-represented, partly-enacted analogy 
between the US and Sparta. 
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 I am not claiming that the interactional patterns that contributed to understanding in this 
case could not have been made denotationally explicit.  Students could have learned about all the 
commonalities between Sparta and the US by denoting them explicitly.  But in this case they did 
not, and in cases like this interactional structure can make essential contributions to cognitive 
accomplishments.  Because all speech has some interactional functions, I suspect that 
interactional processes contribute to ecosocial systems more often than we might think. 
 One might object that, for teachers and students to denote and enact the three role 
positions of powerful, privileged and unprivileged as they did, they must have had a more 
comprehensive underlying mental schema that captures all the relations depicted in Figure 3.  
One might argue, further, that the indexical cues speakers produced and responded to triggered 
aspects of this underlying mental background knowledge.  While I cannot formally refute such 
an explanation, I find it unparsimonious.  We now have substantial evidence that speakers create 
complex patterns of indexical cues and robust interactional texts in many kinds of discursive 
interaction (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Goodwin, 1984, 1995; Irvine, 1992, 
1996; Silverstein, 1985, 1998; Silverstein & Urban, 1996; Wortham, 1994, 1996).  Why should 
we posit mental structures to "explain" this level of organization?  People enact interactional 
patterns that they do not mentally represent, just as they walk without mentally representing all 
the complex movements required.  Instead of positing redundant mental structures, I suggest that 
we flesh out our descriptions of emergent interactional textual structures and begin to explore 
how they might contribute to larger ecosocial systems.  I am not claiming that interactional 
structures by themselves allow cognitive accomplishments, nor am I claiming that interactional 
texts play a more important role than denotational texts or mental representations.  Instead, I 
 41
claim that interactional texts sometimes contribute as one component of the ecosocial systems 
through which cognitive accomplishments occur. 
 If they are not mental representations, however, what kind of entities are indexical cues 
and interactional texts?  Bechtel (1998) and Clark and Toribio (1994) argue that even "low-
level" (i.e., implicit or non-symbolic) aspects of cognitive systems are nonetheless 
"representations" in that they carry information.  Greeno (1997) argues that non-mental aspects 
of ecosocial cognitive systems compose or contribute to "structures of information."  Indexical 
cues are clearly "representations" in this broad sense, because they function semiotically to 
signal information.  Interactional texts are participants' often implicit construals of indexical 
patterns as indicating recognizable types of coherent events.  But describing indexical cues as 
representations and interactional texts as construals of representations should not lead back to a 
dualist account of cognition.  Indexical signs differ in kind from symbolic ones (Peirce, 1955).  
Symbols conventionally represent certain aspects of some possible world, often independent of 
context, while indexical cues simply point to aspects of their context.  In general, interactional 
texts are not mediated by symbolic representations of what is going on.  People simply enact 
some event by producing and orienting to patterns of indexical cues.  Although this process 
involves representation in a broad sense, it should not be assimilated to the more common 
models of symbolic cues and denotational text. 
 In understanding the role interactional text can play in cognition, then, one can draw only 
partly on the analogy of "distributed cognition."  In distributed cognition a group knows how to 
do something, even though no one individual could do it alone, because various individuals carry 
various pieces of the relevant knowledge.  Interactional texts are like this, insofar as the 
cognitively-relevant structure they contribute is distributed across a group.  Jasmine by herself 
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could not have enacted the full set of powerful, privileged and unprivileged role positions.  But 
interactional texts differ from distributed cognition because the structure distributed across the 
group is not primarily "knowledge"⎯in the sense of denotational text or symbolic 
representations.  The group enacts a pattern through coordinated indexical signalling.  That 
pattern is a type of tacit knowledge, a type that generally involves things we can enact but not 
articulate.  As argued by Greeno et al. (1998) and Lave (1993), such participation in social 
practice can contribute to cognitive accomplishments.  By enacting the roles of "unproductive" 
citizens and those in power who judge them, students and teachers contributed to their 
understanding of the similarities between the US and Sparta—in the broad sense of 
"understanding," where it means to contribute competently to discussion that illuminates some 
academic issue. 
 In addition to showing how interactional text can contribute to academic cognitive 
accomplishments, the classroom discussion of Sparta analyzed in this article also shows how 
larger social processes can participate in ecosocial systems.  Greeno et al. (1998) and Lave 
(1996) argue that cognitive accomplishments involve and can transform social identities.  The 
kind of person participants are, they argue, influences what and how participants learn.  And 
what participants learn can shape the kind of people they become.  The classroom discussion of 
Sparta illustrates both these processes.  The understanding accomplished in the conversation 
depended on an analogy between role relationships in Sparta and those common in the US.  
Students and teachers were able to enact roles analogous to those found in Spartan society 
because of their own social positions in the US.  If Jasmine and her peers had been upper middle 
class suburban students and Mrs. Bailey had been an inner city resident, they would surely not 
have enacted the interactional text that they did.  Thus the social identities of participants were 
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integral to their cognitive accomplishments.  And those cognitive accomplishments probably 
reinforced and perhaps even shaped students' and teachers' social identities.  Being positioned as 
unproductive and parasitic—if the students were to experience this regularly—may well shape 
their own and others' senses of who they are. 
 
Conclusions 
 The analysis given in this article contributes in three ways to discussions of situated 
cognition.  First, it shows that complex interactional textual structures in classroom conversation 
can contribute to situated cognition.  The positioning that teachers and students enacted in their 
discussion of Sparta contributed to their understanding of the analogy between the US and 
Sparta—and perhaps to their understanding of social power relations and the common good.  
Any argument by example faces the question of generalizability, however.  How often do 
complex interactional texts of the sort described in this article facilitate understanding?  Clearly 
the interactional text in the Spartan infanticide discussion is both particularly complex and 
closely tied to the denotational text.  Many interactional texts are simpler and less sociologically 
interesting, and many interactional texts do not make such central contributions to denotation 
and cognition.  Wortham (1994) reports that, when "participant examples" serve as catalysts for 
discussion, they often generate rich interactional texts of the sort described in this article.  This 
happens because participant examples double participants' roles and thus set up potential 
analogies between interactional and denotational texts.  Wortham (1997) describes the 
uniqueness of participant examples in which speakers enact what they describe—i.e., in which 
the denotational and interactional texts run parallel.  We can expect that discursive interactions 
that facilitate such parallels (autobiographical narrative is another; cf. Wortham, 1999) will often 
have interactional texts that contribute to cognitive accomplishments.  Although this sort of 
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elaborate parallel between denotational and interactional texts may be somewhat unusual, the 
cases described by Irvine (1996) and Silverstein (1998) show that complex interactional texts 
contribute to denotational text more often that we might expect.  All cognitive accomplishments 
that depend on speech rely to some extent on interactional structure, as established by the case of 
deictics.  But many cognitive accomplishments rely on interactional text, more directly, with the 
extent of this dependence ranging on a continuum up to complex cases like the one described in 
this article. 
 Second, this article establishes that in some cases the understanding of academic subject 
matter can rely in part on complex interactional and social structures.  Even apparently 
"representation-hungry" tasks (Clark & Toribio, 1994) sometimes get accomplished with the 
substantial aid of non-mental ecosocial structures.  One might ask, however, whether this should 
be the case.  In academic discourse, should we not base our arguments and our understanding on 
denotational text as much as possible?  This may be so, although it is a normative and not a 
scientific question.  But in practice all academic discourse inevitably has interactional functions, 
and analysts should try to understand how interactional texts empirically do contribute to the 
understandings achieved through that discourse.  Interactional text might be too pervasive, and 
too productive, to be targeted for elimination. 
 Finally, the analysis given in this article shows that even academic cognitive tasks can 
both depend on and contribute to enduring social and cultural structures (as claimed by 
Engeström (1993) Lave (1996), Lemke (1997)  and Walkerdine (1997)).  It was not accidental 
that lower class black students were the ones positioned as unproductive and parasitic and that 
middle-class white teachers were the ones positioned as welfare critics.  Students and teachers 
were able to enact this pattern so easily, when this interactional text fit into and complemented 
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the ecosocial system, because in our society they often see and experience lower-class blacks 
and middle-class whites being positioned in this way.  We cannot analyze the ecosocial system 
in that classroom, nor could students and teachers have made the cognitive accomplishments 
they did, if the larger social structure had been significantly different.  At least in some cases, 
then, analyses of situated cognition cannot ignore social structure. 
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Appendix 
Transcription Conventions 
'-' abrupt breaks or stops (if several, stammering) 
'?' rising intonation 
'.' falling intonation 
'_' (underline) stress 
(1.0) silences, timed to the nearest second 
'[' indicates simultaneous talk by two speakers, with one utterance represented 
 on top of the other and the moment of overlap marked by left brackets 
'=' interruption or next utterance following immediately, or continuous talk 
 represented on separate lines because of need to represent overlapping 
 comment on intervening line 
'[…]' transcriber comment 
':' elongated vowel 
'°…°' segment quieter than surrounding talk 
',' pause or breath without marked intonation 
'(hh)' laughter breaking into words while speaking 
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